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Summary 
The rights of women living in societies ruled by laws based on Shari‘a 
constitute a controversial question in the human rights debate in many 
countries today. Suggestions that these laws are of a divine nature, and as 
such cannot be overridden by the human rights principles of western origin 
leads to discussions in several areas, such as the right to religion, the human 
rights tradition in Muslim countries, the responsibility of states toward their 
subjects, and the power of the CEDAW Committee. 
 
As of today, 171 countries have ratified the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The rights 
within marriage and at its dissolution are treated in article 16, stating equal 
rights for women and men in these matters. CEDAW in general and article 
16 in particular shall also be interpreted to encompass violence against 
women, although this is not explicitly stated in any of the articles of the 
Convention. Special attention has therefore been given to the aspects of 
domestic violence and its consequences for women. 
 
In this thesis, three countries that recently submitted their reports to the 
CEDAW Committee, have been selected to constitute the basis for this 
discussion. The three countries are Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, countries 
that to some extent share a common history, but today have evolved in very 
different directions. 
 
Egypt and Tunisia have both entered reservations to CEDAW, whereas 
Yemen has not entered any. Yemen is on the other hand showing great 
failure in its implementation, while Egypt is making slow progress as its 
government tries to perform some kind of balancing-act between its 
international obligations under human rights law and pressure from national 
neo-Islamic movements. In Tunisia the emancipation of women has come 
the furthest, but the human rights situation in general is not very good. 
 
Many discriminatory customs such as female genital mutilation and child 
marriage are being promoted as part of Islam when in reality these traditions 
have other origin. It is my opinion that this fact, if supported by 
governments and preferably also by laws, could constitute the incitement to 
abandon these customs.  As usual, although it cannot be said too often, it is 
all a matter of interpretation, and as women are starting to question the 
grounds for these interpretations, and also contribute with newer ones, there 
is hope for change.   
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1 Introduction 
1.1 My choice 
As technology seems to make the world geographically smaller, it does at 
the same time seem to widen the cultural gaps, creating new, invisible 
borders between humans, although they may be living in the same country. 
Parts of this thesis will attempt to bridge some of those gaps. The fear and 
scepticism so many feel towards Islamic culture is not easily erased, 
especially not when media takes care of the opinion-making for us, and 
facilitates the world by providing its incomplete story of terrorists and 
women beaters. I would like to go beyond that and at least make an attempt 
to provide another background than the regular Islam phobic one, where all 
Muslims are treated as a single-minded entity. 
 
The choice to write my thesis on women’s rights and Islamic law, or 
Shari‛a, was not a difficult one. The impact religion has on our lives 
fascinates me, and the translation of religion into law intrigues me. 
Although the phenomenon of incorporation of religion into law is not a new 
one, neither exclusive for Islam, I feel that the complexity of Shari‛a needs 
further exploration, especially when discussing women’s issues.  
 
Curiosity, and a desire to understand, made me write this thesis, and I did 
learn a lot in the process. 
 
1.2 Aim and delimitations of the thesis 
To have equal rights within marriage and at its dissolution, to enter freely 
into marriage, to have equal rights and responsibilities with regard to mutual 
children, the same rights in respect of property, and also a right not to be 
married when still a child; these are rights that I take for granted, but that 
millions of women all over the world are being denied. These rights are 
stated in article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (hereinafter referred to as CEDAW). 
 
My primary aim with this thesis is to look at Shari‛a from a human rights 
perspective, and conduct a discussion with its focus on the human rights as 
stated in article 16 of CEDAW.  
 
In order to achieve this aim, it is necessary to give some explanations. First I 
will give an introduction to women’s rights and the international 
instruments regulating them. The focus will lie on CEDAW article 16, and 
on the marriage-, and family related violence that article 16 is interpreted to 
encompass.  
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It would be meaningless to perform this discussion if a thorough effort to 
explain the meaning of Shari‛a, its origin and functions of today, wasn’t 
made. To enhance this explanation some examples will be given. Three 
countries; Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, whom all recently submitted their 
reports to the CEDAW Committee, will visualise various ways Shari‛a can 
be applied in.  
 
I think that it is necessary to look at more than one country in order to 
understand the complexity of the different legal systems, or simply to 
understand that the Islamic legal tradition is not a monolithic entity, there 
are quite big differences between various Islamic countries. I will try to see 
if, or to what extent, Shari‛a plays a part in the law making of these 
countries. I will evaluate these three countries’ implementation of CEDAW 
article 16, and if reservations to it have been made by any of the countries, 
is that due to the interpretation of Shari‛a in that country?  
 
Finally, I will look at the concluding comments of the three countries made 
by the CEDAW Committee and try to evaluate the work of the Committee 
in order to see if constituency can be found in these three cases. The 
evaluation of the concluding comments is essential for the thesis since these 
comments are the primary means of controlling CEDAW signatories.  
 
As must be quite obvious, there can be no thorough study of the three 
countries mentioned. A short introduction of each country will be given, but 
after that focus will lie on the laws and legislators associated with Shari‛a 
and its possible effect on CEDAW article 16.  
 
This is a thesis about the law of Shari‛a. The historical, religious, social and 
cultural background in this thesis is there because I deem it necessary for a 
comprehensive understanding of the subject. I do not wish to make my own 
religious interpretation of the Quran, but merely emphasise that 
interpretations vary a lot.  
 
I am aware that I will only be able to disturb the surface of an ocean in these 
50 pages; so therefore, another aim of this thesis is to capture the interest of 
anyone who may read this, an interest that hopefully will lead to increased 
awareness of the complexity of these issues. 
 
1.3 Method  
This thesis is based on literature studies conducted at the library of the 
Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, and at 
the Lund University library. An important source in finding needed material 
has been the homepage of the United Nations (hereinafter referred to as the 
U.N.). The thesis has both a descriptive and an analytical part.  
 
Recent years have witnessed a spurt of literature concerning women in 
Muslim societies, but these have been largely confined to philosophical, 
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sociological and historical accounts.1 The literature that does concern law is 
usually of a generalising kind, treating problems in common for these 
societies, rather than country-wise. Yemen has proved to be the country 
least written about in legal matters, and Egypt by far the most popular. 
 
1.4 Definitions 
CEDAW 
CEDAW is in this thesis used to refer to the Convention on All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women. The Committee on the elimination of 
Discrimination against women is referred to as the CEDAW Committee. 
 
Shari‘a 
In this thesis, Shari‘a is to be understood as the principles that are used 
when creating Islamic law. Most scholars do not make a distinction between 
the meaning of Shari‛a and Fiqh. In this thesis Shari‛a is intended to be 
understood as the sources as defined within Sunni and Shi‛a Islam, 
unconverted into a legal text. When referring to Islamic law I mean the law 
of a particular state or states who have based its law upon the sources of 
Shari‛a. 
 
Polygamy 
The correct term to use when referring to a man being allowed to take more 
than one wife would be polygyny, but I will use the term polygamy instead 
since it is a more frequently used and understood term. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Ali, Shaheen Sardar, p.4 
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2 Women’s rights 
2.1 Women’s rights are human rights 
One could argue that there should be no need for specifying women’s rights 
since these rights are basic human rights too. But since the goal of equality 
is far from being reached, women’s rights have since the establishment of 
the U.N. been given a more prominent role, not only through a separate 
convention, but also in our basic human rights instruments. 
 
In the following, examples of how women’s rights are being emphasised in 
our fundamental Human Rights instruments will be given. 
 
2.1.1 UDHR 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as 
UDHR) was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on the 10th of 
December 1948, and is the pillar upon which all human rights Conventions 
and Declarations rest.2
 
The Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as CHR) and the 
Commission on the Status of Women (hereinafter referred to as CSW) 
clashed several times during the process of drafting the UDHR in 1946-48. 
The original draft was changed from “all men are brothers” to “all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” thanks to the CSW.3 
This text now constitutes article 1 of the UDHR.  
 
Article 2 contains one of the most fundamental principles in international 
human rights law, the principle of equality. The prohibition of 
discrimination applies to all other human rights. It states that “(e)veryone is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex…”4 The right to equality 
before the law can be found in article 7, and the right to a nationality, that 
especially applies to women, in article 14. 
 
The right to marry and found a family is established in article 16, and 
concerns various aspects of this right. First, the right to marry, “without 
limitation due to race, nationality or religion”, rights protecting the persons 
entering into marriage, such as consent, minimum age, and equal rights of 
                                                 
2 General Assembly resolution 217A (III) 10 December 1948 
3 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs/SIDA, A Handbook on CEDAW, 2000, p7. See also 
UDHR art.1. 
4 UDHR art.2, Alfredsson, Gudmundur and Eide, Asbjorn, ”The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights – A Common Standard of Achievement”, 1999 Kluwer Law International, 
p. 87 
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the spouses during the marriage and at its dissolution. Secondly, the right to 
found a family, and the protection of it, and finally, the notion of the family 
as “the natural and fundamental group unit of society”5   
 
The UDHR is a resolution, and as such it does not bind the Member States. 
Although, many argue that UDHR is to be considered as international 
customary law.6
 
2.1.2 ICCPR 
The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter 
referred to as ICCPR) was adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 and 
entered into force ten years later.7
 
Article 2 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights is a 
non-discrimination clause similar to article 2 of UDHR, stating equality 
under the Covenant without distinction of any kind, with emphasis on 
providing an effective remedy for any person whose rights according to the 
Convention, are violated. Article 3 gives further emphasis to the obligation 
of the States Parties to “ensure the equal right of men and women to the 
enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth…”  
 
The right to marry is also protected by ICCPR, and article 23(2-3) states that 
free and full consent of the intending spouses is required for a marriage to 
take place, and article 23(4) goes on stating that the State Parties to ICCPR 
shall take steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses 
“as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution”.  
 
Article 26 states all individuals’ equality before the law, requiring the law to 
prohibit any discrimination, and “guarantee to all persons equal and 
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as…sex”. 
 
ICCPR has so far been ratified by 149 states.8  
 
2.1.3 ICESCR 
The principle of non-discrimination can be found in article 2(2) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(hereinafter referred to as ICESCR), and equal rights for men and women in 
the enjoyment of these rights are laid down in article 3.  
 
                                                 
5 Alfredsson and Eide, p. 327. Nota bene: No precise definition of the family exists, and 
there is no consensus in international law as to the meaning of the term.  
6 Alfredsson and Eide, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights – A Common 
Standard of Achievement” 
7 General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 
8 http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf As of May 2003  
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The condition that marriage should be entered into only with free will is 
confirmed in article 10(1). Article 10(2) recognizes that special protection 
should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable time before and after 
childbirth.  
 
2.1.4 CRC 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter referred to as CRC) 
was adopted by the General Assembly in 1989 and entered into force 1990, 
achieving almost universal ratification by 1996. The term “child” means, 
according to CRC article 1, “every human being below the age of eighteen 
years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained 
earlier.” 
 
Article 2 states that States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights in the 
Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without any kind of 
discrimination. Article 7(1) gives every child the right to acquire a 
nationality, and the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. 
According to article 18(1), States Parties shall “use their best efforts to 
ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common 
responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child.”  
 
2.2 Women’s rights – a brief history 
International efforts to address problems involving the status of women 
began with the women’s suffrages movement in the late 19th Century. Some 
early attempts were also made by the Pan American Union and the League 
of Nations.9
 
When the U.N. was established after the Second World War, the incitement 
for the development of international human rights protection was strong. At 
the time of the UDHR, the majority of the world’s women could not vote. 
Securing political rights for women were therefore prioritised. The early 
years of the U.N: s support for women focused upon establishing women’s 
legal equality in areas such as political participation, work, education, 
nationality and marriage.10 The U.N: s involvement in women’s issues 
marked the beginning of a historic change in political discourse, in which 
issues considered strictly private, such as the status of women as wives and 
mothers would come to be openly debated in a global context.11
 
                                                 
9 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, The United Nations 
Blue Book Series, Volume VI, New York, p9 
 
10 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, The United Nations 
Blue Book Series, Volume VI, New York, p8f 
11 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, The United Nations 
Blue Book Series, Volume VI, New York, p8 
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2.2.1 The Commission on the Status of Women 
The CSW was established in 1946 under the Economic and Social Council 
(hereinafter referred to as ECOSOC). The object of the Commission is to 
promote implementation of the principle that men and women shall have 
equal rights.12 ECOSOC determines the Commission to have two basic 
functions: “to prepare recommendations and reports to the Economic and 
Social Council on promoting women’s rights in political, economic, social 
and educational fields”, and to “make recommendations to the Council on 
urgent problems requiring immediate attention in the field of women’s 
rights”.13 The CSW has the authority to receive communications sent to it 
by individuals or organizations in order to identify consistent patterns of 
discriminatory practices. The communications may only be used as a source 
of information since the CSW has no authorization to take action.14 The 
mandate of the CSW was expanded in 1987 to include such activities as the 
advocacy of equality, development and peace, monitoring of the 
implementation of internationally agreed measures for the advancement of 
women, and reviewing and appraising progress at the national, sub regional, 
regional, sectoral and global levels.15 The CSW: s current work is closely 
related to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.16
 
In its 1947 statements of principles the CSW declared that “Freedom and 
equality are essential to human development”, and “since woman is as much 
human being as man, she is entitled to share these attributes with him”.17
 
Like the UDHR, both ICCPR and ICESCR include provisions specifying 
that the rights therein apply equally to men and women. This emphasis was 
added after the CSW presented CHR with suggested amendments to the 
drafts of the Covenants.18
 
2.2.2 Recognizing Women’s Rights: 1952-1975 
In 1952, the General Assembly adopted The Convention on the Political 
Rights of Women, the first instrument of international law aimed at 
recognizing and protecting the political rights of women everywhere.19  
 
                                                 
12 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/ när? 
13 E/RES/2/11, 21 June 1946 (ECOSOC resolution establishing the Commission on the 
Status of Women) 
14 Cook, Rebecca J. Human rights of women – National and International Perspectives, 
University of Pennsylvania Press 1994, p.25 
15 E/RES/1987/24, 26 May 1987 (ECOSOC res adopting the long-term programme of work 
of the CSW to the year 2000) 
16 See 2.2.5 below 
17 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, The United Nations 
Blue Book Series, Volume VI, New York, p14 
18 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, The United Nations 
Blue Book Series, Volume VI, New York, p16 
19 General Assembly resolution 640(VII) of 20 December 1952 
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The question of women’s rights of nationality in marriage was a major focus 
of the CSW from its first session in 1947. At that time, a woman who 
married a man of a different nationality could find herself deprived of her 
own nationality, and in some cases stateless, especially in the event of a 
divorce.20 The Convention on the Nationality of Married Women was 
adopted in 1957 with a large number of abstentions due to opposition to the 
idea that a nation’s sovereign interests could be overridden by the 
international human rights principle of non-discrimination.21
 
In 1959, the CSW urged ECOSOC to press for an international instrument 
carrying great authority that would cover the minimum age for marriage, 
free consent and registration of marriages. The result was two separate 
instruments, a convention and a non-binding recommendation.22
 
Early in the 1950s the problem of customs, ancient laws and practices that 
were harmful to women and girls came into focus. In an ECOSOC 
resolution the member states were called upon to take measures to abolish 
“all customs which violate the physical integrity of women, and which 
thereby violate the dignity and worth of the human person as declared in the 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”.23 At that point, 
there seemed little likelihood of any strong international action to eliminate 
practices such as female genital mutilation, and the matter was put aside and 
did not surface again until the 1970’s.24
 
In 1963, the work to draft a declaration on the elimination of discrimination 
against women began. The aim was to gather all of the standards on 
women’s rights that had been developed since 1945. Although much of the 
declaration dealt with issues already covered in earlier instruments there 
were disagreements, especially with the provisions on marriage, family and 
employment. Four years later, the Declaration was accepted, and another 
important aim in securing the legal foundation of women’s equality was 
accomplished.25
 
1975 was designated International Women’s Year, aiming to remind the 
international community that discrimination against women was a persistent 
problem in much of the world, and that joint efforts in this area needed to 
increase. During this year, the first international women’s conference was 
held in Mexico City. When the Conference came to a close, delegates had 
                                                 
20 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, The United Nations 
Blue Book Series, Volume VI, New York, p19f 
21 UN Treaty Series, vol.309, No.4468, p.65 and The United Nations and the Advancement 
of Women 1945-1996, The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume VI, New York, p20 
22 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, The United Nations 
Blue Book Series, Volume VI, New York, p21f 
23 E/RES/445 C (XIV), 28 May 1952, see also A/RES/843 (IX), 17 December 1954 
24 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, The United Nations 
Blue Book Series, Volume VI, New York, p23 
25 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, The United Nations 
Blue Book Series, Volume VI, New York, p29f 
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adopted a “World Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Objectives 
of the International Women’s Year”, offering a comprehensive set of 
guidelines for the advancement of women until 1985. Its overall objective 
was threefold: to promote equality between men and women; to ensure the 
integration of women in the total development effort; and to increase the 
contribution of women to the strengthening of world peace.26 To ensure that 
national and international action to advance the status of women was 
sustained, the conference urged that the U.N. proclaim the period from 1976 
to 1985 as the United Nations Decade for Women and Development.27
 
2.2.3 The Decade for Women and Development: 1976-
1985 
The Decade for Women is remembered for several historic events. For the 
first time, U.N. statistics dramatized the fact that women’s rights were far 
from being isolated issues, but important factors in the well being of all 
people. Studies conducted throughout the world showed that declines in 
infant mortality, improved nutrition and medical care as well as lower 
fertility rates were functions of a mother’s level of education.28  
 
A new autonomous U.N.-affiliated institution was created, the International 
Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, 
INSTRAW, aiming to conduct research and studies with particular attention 
paid to problems facing women in developing countries.29
 
The Voluntary Fund for the United Nations Decade was renamed the United 
Nations Development Fund for Women, UNIFEM, and authorized as a new, 
permanent, autonomous body.30
 
The second global conference on women was held 1980 in Copenhagen, and 
had the objectives to review the progress in implementing the goals of the 
Mexico City Conference, and to update the 1975 World Plan of Action. 
Unfortunately, no consensus was reached, although the Programme of 
Action was adopted, calling for stronger national measures to ensure 
women’s ownership, and right to inheritance and child custody.31
 
The third global conference on women took place in Nairobi 1985. The 372-
paragraph Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of 
Women was debated at length, but finally adopted by consensus. The 
Forward-looking Strategies were an updated blueprint for the future of 
                                                 
26 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, The United Nations 
Blue Book Series, Volume VI, New York, p33ff, and E/CONF.66/34, 1976 
27 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, The United Nations 
Blue Book Series, Volume VI, New York, p36 
28 Ibid p37 
29 Ibid p39 
30 Ibid p40 
31 Ibid 44f 
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women to the end of the century. The document contained a series of 
measures for implementing equality at the national level, and guidelines for 
the participation of women in efforts to promote peace.32
 
2.2.4 Beijing and onwards33 
A review of the progress made five years after the Nairobi Conference gave 
a discouraging picture of the general progress of development made 
worldwide, and especially the effects this had on women in developing 
countries. In 1995, another review showed some progress in the aftermaths 
of the cold war where democratisation gave women new opportunities, but 
also stated that women continue to be the majority of the countless victims 
of political and ethnic violence, and that much remains to be done before the 
world can claim that the objectives of the Nairobi Forward-looking 
Strategies have been achieved.34  
 
The fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing 1995 and was 
the most heavily attended U.N. conference in history. 189 countries adopted 
the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action unanimously35.  
 
The Platform for Action is an agenda for women's empowerment. It aims at 
accelerating the implementation of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies 
for the Advancement of Women and at removing all the obstacles to 
women's active participation in all spheres of public and private life through 
a full and equal share in economic, social, cultural and political decision-
making. This means that the principle of shared power and responsibility 
should be established between women and men at home, in the workplace 
and in the wider national and international communities.36  
 
The Platform for Action recognizes that women face barriers to full equality 
and advancement because of such factors as their race, age, language, 
ethnicity, culture, religion or disability, because they are indigenous women 
or because of other status. Many women encounter specific obstacles related 
to their family status.37
 
Four years after the Beijing Conference, governments were asked to report 
on their actions to implement the Platform for Action in the 12 critical areas 
                                                 
32 Ibid 46f 
33 CEDAW was adopted before the Beijing conference, see 2.2.5 below 
34 E/CN.6/1995/3, 10 January 1995, and E/CN.6/1995/3/Add.1, 24 February 1995 
“Overview of the Report of the Secretary-General to the CSW on the Second Review and 
appraisal of the implementation of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the 
Advancement of Women”, and Ibid p.50f 
35 Ibid p63 
36 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/plat1.htm#statement as of 21 April 2003  
37 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/plat1.htm#objectives As of 21 April 
2003  
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of concern.38 Review of the national reports show that profound changes in 
the status and role of women have occurred in the years since the start of the 
United Nations Decade for Women in 1976. Women have entered the labour 
force in unprecedented numbers, increasing the potential for their ability to 
participate in economic decision making at various levels, starting with the 
household.39  
 
Despite much progress, responses from Member States indicate that much 
more work needs to be done with regard to implementation of the Platform 
for Action. Two major areas - violence and poverty - continue to be major 
obstacles to gender equality worldwide. Globalisation has added new 
dimensions to both areas, creating new challenges for the implementation of 
the Platform, such as trafficking in women and girls, changing nature of 
armed conflict, and the growing gap between nations and genders.40
 
2.2.5 Finally a separate women’s convention 
Soon after the establishment of the U.N. a need to specify women’s rights in 
a separate convention was acknowledged, and efforts were being made 
already in 1946 to draft a women’s charter. Unfortunately the CHR rejected 
this.41 It wasn’t until 1974 that the work on what would become CEDAW 
began, although the idea had existed much longer. 
 
The draft Convention was met by a large lack of consensus, reflecting the 
many remaining obstacles to women’s advancement. By late 1979, strong 
differences still remained, but the Convention was finally adopted by the 
General Assembly that year, by a vote of 130 to none, with 11 abstentions.42 
It was clear, however, that the overwhelming vote in favour did not reflect 
general satisfaction with the agreement; nearly 40 countries had expressed 
reservations on specific provisions.43
 
CEDAW is the first international legal instrument to define discrimination 
against women, a description to be found in Article 1, stating that 
discrimination against women is “any distinction, exclusion or restriction 
made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or 
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of 
their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
                                                 
38 These 12 areas are: poverty, education, health care, violence, armed conflict, economy, 
decision-making, lack of respect for, and insufficient mechanisms to promote the 
advancement of women, stereotyping, inequalities in the management of natural resources, 
and persistent discrimination against and violation of the rights of the girl child. 
39 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/bfbeyond.htm As of 21 April 2003  
40 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/bfbeyond.htm As of 21 April 2003 
41 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs/SIDA, A Handbook on CEDAW, 2000, p.7 
42 The abstaining States were Bangladesh, Brazil, Comoros, Djibouti, Haiti, Mauritainia, 
Mexico, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Senegal. U.N. Doc. A/34/830 18 December 1979. 
43 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, The United Nations 
Blue Book Series, Volume VI, New York, p41 
 15
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, 
civil or any other field.”44
 
CEDAW is also unique due to its requirement that Governments work to 
eliminate discrimination against women not only in the public sphere, but in 
private life as well.45
 
As of March 2003, 171 countries – almost ninety per cent of the members of 
the United Nations – are party to the convention, and an additional 3 have 
signed the treaty, binding them to do nothing in contravention of its terms.46
 
The many reservations accompanying the ratifications of the treaty involves 
11 different articles. While the largest number of reservations refers to the 
role of the International Court of Justice in arbitration disputes, the largest 
number of substantive reservations concerns the provisions on the 
elimination of discrimination in marriage and family in Article 16.47  
 
There was a need for CEDAW already in 1946 and there certainly is now. 
 
2.2.6 Means of control 
The obligations of a state that has ratified CEDAW are very clear. 
According to the Convention, States Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures, including legislation, to guarantee women the exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. They shall also 
embody the principle of equality in their national legislation and ensure its 
practical realisation.48
 
 
2.2.6.1 The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women 
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women met 
for the first time in 1982. Its main task, as described in article 18 of 
CEDAW is to consider reports submitted by Governments concerning 
“legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures” adopted to comply 
with the Convention, and also to submit reports that “may indicate factors 
and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment of obligations.49 States that 
are parties to the Convention are obliged to report within one year of 
ratification, and subsequently every four years, on the steps they have taken 
                                                 
44 UN Treaty Series, vol.1249, No. 20378, p.13 
45 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, p. 42  
46 www.un.org/womenswatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm as of 30 March 2003   
47 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, The United Nations 
Blue Book Series, Volume VI, New York, p42, Reservations also concern articles 1, 2, 4, 
5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 15. 
48 CEDAW articles 2 and 3 
49 Ibid p.43, CEDAW art.18 
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towards full implementation, and of the obstacles they face.50 The 
Committee examines the States’ reports, enters into a constructive dialogue 
with the State party and makes concluding comments, expressing the 
concerns of the Committee. The Committee also plays an important role in 
making States parties withdraw their reservations to core provisions of 
CEDAW, especially articles 2 and 16.51
 
The Committee issues general recommendations that provide detailed 
guidance on different articles of CEDAW, and the steps necessary to 
comply with them. These recommendations are non-binding, but important, 
since they help to influence Governments to take steps towards full 
implementation.52
 
2.2.6.2 The Optional Protocol 
 
On October 6th 1999, the General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol 
to CEDAW, which entered into force on 22 December 2000, and called on 
all States parties to the Convention to become party to the new instrument 
as soon as possible.53
 
The Protocol contains two procedures, a communications procedure and an 
inquiry procedure. The communications procedure allows individuals, or 
groups of individuals, to submit claims of violations of the rights put forth 
in CEDAW, committed by a State party under whose jurisdiction they fall. 
Communications will not be considered unless all domestic remedies have 
been exhausted, or if they are anonymous.54
 
The inquiry procedure enables the CEDAW Committee to investigate 
indications of grave or systematic violations against the rights set forth in 
CEDAW committed by a State party. The inquiry procedure shall be 
conducted confidentially and in cooperation with the state concerned. The 
Protocol allows States upon ratification or accession to declare that they do 
not accept the inquiry procedure, otherwise no reservations are allowed.55
 
Under the communications procedure, the CEDAW Committee will be able 
to say what is required from States in individual circumstances, helping 
States to better understand the meaning of the obligations they have 
undertaken by acceding to CEDAW. The Optional Protocol should also 
encourage States to implement CEDAW to avoid complaints being made 
against them.56  
                                                 
50 Ibid p53 
51 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations.htm 16 April 2003  
52 Ibid p54 
53 Optional Protocol to the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, General Assembly resolution A54/4, 6 October 1999. .As of March 2003: 
75 signatories and 49 parties. 
54 Optional Protocol to CEDAW, articles 2-4 
55 Optional Protocol to CEDAW, articles 8, 10, 17 
56 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/why.htm 16 April 2003  
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 2.2.6.3 The interstate procedure 
 
According to article 29 of CEDAW, two or more State parties can refer 
disputes about the interpretation and implementation of CEDAW to 
arbitration. If the dispute is not settled, it can be referred to the International 
Court of Justice. 
 
This procedure is subject to a large number of reservations and has never 
been used.57
 
2.2.6.4 Other enforcement mechanisms for women’s human 
rights 
 
Other means to enforce CEDAW and the human rights put forward therein 
are, for example, the procedures to seek information from governments 
established by the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, the 
CSW Communications Procedure, enabling CSW to receive confidential 
communications about discrimination against women. The procedure is 
merely a source of information for the CSW and has no links to the legal 
framework of CEDAW.58  
 
Furthermore, there is the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, allowing 
individuals to submit written communications to the Human Rights 
Committee. Article 26 of the ICCPR provides that all people are equal 
before the law. The Human Rights Committee has decided that the scope of 
article 26 is not limited to civil and political rights; it can therefore be used 
to challenge discriminatory laws whether or not they relate to civil and 
political rights.59
 
The Procedure for Dealing with Communications relating to Violations of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, often referred to as the 1503-
procedure, was adopted by ECOSOC in 1970. It authorizes the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
to consider all communications that appear to reveal a consistent pattern of 
gross violations of human rights, and refer to the CHR particular situations, 
which then can become the subject of an ad hoc committee. The procedure 
of the committee is confidential.60  
 
                                                 
57 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/why.htm 16 April 2003   
58 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/why.htm 16 April 2003  
59 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/why.htm As of 16 April 2003  
60 ECOSOC resolution 1503 of 27 May 1970 
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3 Marriage and Family relations 
3.1 Introduction 
States have very different legislation on the marital status of women. 
Regulations that stipulate the legal age of marriage, the legality of 
polygamy, and conditions for remarriage and divorce rights often have 
discriminatory effects on women. These provisions do in many cases exist 
alongside constitutional guarantees of equality and non-discrimination.61
 
On the one hand, the family can be the source of positive and caring values 
where individuals bond through mutual respect and love. On the other hand, 
it can be a social institution where labour is exploited and male sexual 
power is violently expressed. The negative images of the self, which often 
inhibit women from realizing their full potential, may be linked to familial 
expectation.62
 
3.2 Drafting history 
CEDAW article 16 was subject to thorough discussions before the draft 
article finally was adopted by the CSW by 21 votes to 0, with 2 
abstentions.63 Some governments suggested that a separate convention 
should be drawn up to cover women’s legal and marriage rights, or that they 
should be mentioned in CEDAW as well as being the subject of a separate 
convention, while others rather sought to limit these rights by forwarding 
arguments that consideration should be given to various States’ family laws 
and the religious provisions therein.64  
 
The inclusion of a sub-paragraph or article on violence against women was 
not discussed during the drafting process.  
 
Based on the twin principles of freedom of choice and equality within the 
marriage, article 16 clearly sets out the framework for marriage and family 
relations.65  
                                                 
61 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, E/CN.4/2002/83, pt.66 
62 E/CN./4/1995/42, 22 November 1994, pt.54 
63 Rehof, Lars Adam, “Guide to the Travaux Préparatoires of the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1993 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, p.173.  
64 Rehof p.170 
65 E/CN.4/2002/83, Integration of Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective – 
Violence against Women,  
 19
3.3 CEDAW article 16 
Article 16 is very comprehensive and will here be dealt with sentence by 
sentence. 
 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage 
and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of 
equality of men and women: 
 
Most States parties report that national constitutions and laws comply with 
the Convention, but in reality custom, tradition and enforcement failure 
contravene it.66  
 
Family violence is prevalent in all societies. Within family relationships 
women of all ages are subjected to violence of all kinds, including battering, 
rape, other forms of sexual assault, mental and other forms of violence.67
  
Women who have traditionally performed their roles in the private or 
domestic sphere have long had those activities treated as inferior. As such 
activities are invaluable for the survival of society, there can be no 
justification for applying different or discriminatory laws or customs to 
them.68
 
 
a) The same right to enter into marriage; 
 
It was proposed that this paragraph also should contain the right not to 
marry, but after objections the proposal was withdrawn.69
 
Polygamous marriages contravenes a woman’s right to equality with men, 
and can have such serious emotional and financial consequences for her and 
her dependants that such marriages ought to be discouraged and 
prohibited.70
 
b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into 
marriage only with their free and full consent; 
 
A woman’s right to choose a spouse and enter freely into marriage is central 
to her life and to her dignity and equality as a human being.71 Forced 
marriage in order to strengthen family links, protect family honour and 
cultural ideals, is a common occurrence in many societies. Forced marriage 
                                                 
66 General  Recommendation No.21, p.15 
67 General Recommendation No.19, p.23 
68 General Recommendation 21 of CEDAW, UN 1994, p.11 and 12 
69 Rehof, p.173 
70 General Recommendation 21 of CEDAW, p.14 
71 General Recommendation 21 of CEDAW, p16 
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is a marriage conducted without the valid consent of both parties, and must 
not be confused with arranged marriage, which operates successfully within 
many communities. Forcing a victim of rape to marry the perpetrator is 
common in many societies.72
 
c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its 
dissolution; 
 
The application of common law principles, customary or religious law, 
rather than the principles contained in CEDAW, have wide-ranging 
consequences for women since they invariably restrict their rights to equal 
status and responsibility within marriage. Such limitations often result in the 
husband being accorded the status of head of household and primary 
decision maker.73 Adequate performance of “wifely duties” is required for a 
woman in order to avoid physical and emotional threats. In the majority of 
countries criminal law can be invoked for assault in marriage, but not for 
rape.74
 
In some societies, the difficulties and the humiliation a divorced woman 
faces keeps many women in hostile marriages.75 As in UDHR, divorce is 
not mentioned in CEDAW, and article 16 does not specify what kind of 
dissolution it refers to. The prohibition of divorce in conjunction with 
permission of polygamy can be discriminatory since the men can marry 
several women, but the women will neither have the possibility to divorce, 
nor to marry a second person. This situation will clearly violate the equal 
rights of the spouses.76
 
d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of 
their marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all 
cases the interests of the children shall be paramount; 
 
The children of unions where the parents are not married do not always 
enjoy the same status as those born in wedlock and the father often fail to 
share the responsibility for his children.77
 
Women that have to bear and raise children alone often find their personal 
development affected since their right of access to education, employment 
and other activities becomes restrained.78
 
e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number 
and spacing of their children and to have access to the 
                                                 
72 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, E/CN.4/2002/83, pt. 57f 
73 General Recommendation 21 of CEDAW, p.17 
74 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, E/CN.4/2002/83, pt. 62 
75 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, E/CN.4/2002/83, pt. 63 
76 Alfredsson & Eide, p.337 
77 General Recommendation No.21, p19 
78 General Recommendation.No.21, p.21 
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information, education and means to enable them to exercise these 
rights; 
 
Historically, the main duty of women has been to bear children. The 
protection of women’s reproductive rights have however not been a high 
priority. Lack of control over their sexual and reproductive lives and poor 
quality health care result in the violation of this right.  
 
The decision to have children or not must not be limited by spouse, parent, 
partner or Government. Women must have access to information about 
contraceptive measures and their use, and be guaranteed sex education and 
family planning services.79
 
f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, 
wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar 
institutions where these concepts exist in national legislation; in 
all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount; 
 
The principle of granting parents equal status, especially when they are 
not married, is not always observed by States parties. Often, the children 
of such unions do not enjoy the same status as those born in wedlock 
and, where the mothers are divorced or living apart, many fathers fail to 
share the responsibility of care and maintenance of their children.80
 
g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right 
to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation; 
 
When a woman is obliged to change her name on marriage or at its 
dissolution, she is denied the right to choose her name and to preserve 
her individuality and identity.81
 
h) The same right for both spouses in respect of the ownership, 
acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and 
disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable 
consideration. 
 
Any law or custom that in the division of property grants a man a right to 
greater share, often based on the premise that the man alone is responsible 
for the support of the women and the children of his family is discriminatory 
and will have a serious impact on a woman’s practical ability to divorce her 
husband, to support herself or her family and to live in dignity as an 
independent person.82 Lack of economic independence forces many women 
to stay in violent relationships.83
                                                 
79 General Recommendation No.21, p.22, see also CEDAW article 10 (h). 
80 General Recommendation No.21, pt.19 
81 General Recommendation No.21, p.24 
82 General Recommendation No.21 p.28 
83 General Recommendation No. 19, p.23, see also CEDAW article 15 (2). 
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2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal 
effect, and all the necessary action, including legislation, shall be 
taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the 
registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory.” 
 
In many societies, young girls are prepared for marriage from a very early 
age, the reasons being to guarantee virginity and a longer reproductive 
period.84 Domestic law routinely prescribes younger ages for marriage for 
women than for men. The Committee on the Rights of the Child insists that 
child marriage and child bearing by girl children must stop, and that the 
minimum age for marriage should be equal for both sexes.85
   
Early marriage deprives girls of an education and limits their opportunity to 
have roles outside the home. It prevents women from developing skills that 
bring them social or economic independence. Generally, early marriages 
result in early and prolonged childbearing, which can undermine the health 
of both mothers and children.86
 
 
                                                 
84 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, E/CN.4/2002/83, pt.55f 
85 A Handbook on CEDAW, p.36 
86 International Women’s Tribune Centre, Rights of Women – A Guide to the Most 
Important United Nations Treaties on Women’s Human Rights, New York 1998, p38 
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4 Violence against women 
4.1 Violence against women - a rookie on the 
human rights agenda 
The issue of violence against women has only recently found its place on 
the international human rights agenda. Violence against women takes many 
forms, which are now recognized as major impediments to the rights of 
women to participate fully in society. This represents a major shift in 
perception since 1979, when CEDAW was adopted. CEDAW contains no 
specific provision on gender-based violence, but the CSW and the CEDAW 
Committee have made clear that this issue is fundamental to the provisions 
of the Convention.87
 
4.1.1 Background 
The Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women 
from the World Conference of 1985 recognized violence against women as 
an obstacle to the achievement of equality, development and peace, and 
recommended states to combat it, and that a full implementation of CEDAW 
would lead towards elimination of violence against women.88
 
In 1989, the Committee recommended that States should include 
information on violence and how to deal with it in their reports. This was 
affirmed in 1992 by General Recommendation No.19, which stated that 
violence against women was a form of gender discrimination under 
CEDAW, and that the full implementation of the Convention required states 
to take positive measures to eliminate all forms of violence against 
women.89 There have been no objections to General Recommendation 
No.19. 
 
In 1993, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women 
(hereinafter referred to as DEVAW) was adopted by the General Assembly. 
The Declaration affirms that violence against women violates and nullifies 
women’s enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and is 
concerned about the long-standing failure to protect those rights.90  
 
                                                 
87 Ibid p55 
88 Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United 
Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, Nairobi, 15-26 July 1985, 
Chap. I, sect. A. 
89 General Recommendation No.19, p.2 and 4 
90 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, The United Nations 
Blue Book Series, Volume VI, New York, p56f 
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The issue of violence against women is one of the critical areas of concern 
of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.91
 
4.1.2 Special Rapporteur on violence against women 
The concern with the continuing violence against women led to the 
appointment of a Special Rapporteur in 1994. The objectives of the Special 
Rapporteur are to seek information on violence against women from, among 
others, Governments, treaty bodies and non-governmental organizations, 
and to recommend measures at regional, national and international levels on 
how to eliminate violence and its causes.92  
 
4.1.3 Defining violence against women  
Violence against women is, according to DEVAW article 1, “any act of 
gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, 
sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of 
such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, weather occurring in 
public or private life.”93 Gender-based violence is defined by the CEDAW 
Committee as “violence which is directed against a woman because she is a 
woman or which affects women disproportionately”.94  
 
Violence against women can be divided into three categories. First, violence 
committed by the state, which includes violence against women in detention 
as well as violence against women in situations of armed conflict. Secondly, 
violence in the community, including for example rape, sexual assault and 
harassment, trafficking in women, prostitution, pornography and labour 
exploitation. The third category is violence in the family, including incest, 
infanticide, traditional practices etc.95
 
Gender-based violence can include breaching specific provisions of 
CEDAW, regardless that those provisions do not mention violence.96
 
4.2 Domestic violence 
The CEDAW Committee refers to domestic violence as “one of the most 
insidious forms of violence against women”.97
 
                                                 
91 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/plat1.htm#concern  “Critical areas of 
concern” pt. 44 As of May 2003  
92 CHR resolution 1994/45 11 March 1994, pt. 7 
93 DEVAW, General Assembly resolution 48/104, 20 December 1993 
94 General Recommendation No. 19, pt. 6 
95 E/CN.4/1995/42, 22 November 1994, pt. I.7, ”Preliminary report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women to the Commission on Human Rights” 
96 General Recommendation No. 19, pt. 7 
97 General Recommendation No. 19 p.23 
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4.2.1 Scope of domestic violence 
There are many types of domestic violence, and the victims range from 
children to elderly, servants and wives, the last being the most frequent. 
According to DEVAW article 2, domestic violence is to be understood to 
encompass, but not be limited to “(p)hysical, sexual and psychological 
violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female 
children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female 
genital mutilation…” 
 
Many traditional practices also fall within the scope of domestic violence. 
For example selective abortion, malnutrition, childhood marriage, widow 
burning, virginity tests, and as mentioned above, female genital mutilation 
and dowry-related violence.98
 
4.2.2 Causes of domestic violence 
The Preamble of DEVAW locates the roots of violence against women in 
the “historically unequal power relations between men and women”. 
 
Among the other causes discussed one can mention the inequality in the 
general structures of society, and in the family, which accept male 
dominance and female submissiveness. Another cause is the economic and 
social factors where studies point to unemployment and low wages as 
causes of domestic violence, since they in their turn often lead to stress and 
frustration. Violence does however also exist in wealthier circles.  
 
The discussions also encompass the prevalence of alcohol and drug abuse 
by the perpetrator, violence as a learned behaviour, where childhood abuse 
leads to a violent behaviour as an adult. Certain cultural factors may also 
precipitate violence against women.99
 
In the past, the State and the law intervened with regard to violence in the 
home only when the violence became a public nuisance. In recent times 
however, the approach to law has changed, and States are reaching into the 
privacy of the home. States are now increasingly being held responsible for 
human rights offences committed within the home. States are required to 
prevent as well as punish crimes of violence which take place in the private 
sphere.100  
 
Sadly, the permissive attitude of the past still prevails. The seriousness of 
the crime is rarely acknowledged, and many countries do not recognise 
                                                 
98 E/CN.4/1995/42, 22 November 1994, pt. 143 
99 E/CN.4/1995/42, 22 November 1994, pt. 119 
100 E/CN.4/1995/42, 22 November 1994, pt. 70 
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them as such in their laws. The inaction of governments is perhaps the 
greatest cause of violence against women.101  
 
4.2.3 Consequences and remedies  
Since there is very little statistics on violence against women it is difficult to 
estimate its consequences. It is clear however, that fear is an immediate 
consequence, which will lead to limited movement and independence. 
 
Serious health problems are another consequence. Besides physical injuries, 
women who have been abused are subject to depressions and personality 
disorders. 
 
Violence prevents women from participating fully in the life of the family 
and in society, and prevents both society and women from reaching their 
full potential.102
 
The CEDAW Committee has made recommendations to States parties on 
how to eliminate violence against women. For example, States should 
ensure laws to give adequate protection to all women, encourage research 
on the subject, take measures to ensure that the media respect women, 
introduce education and information programmes to eliminate prejudices, 
provide effective complaint procedures and remedies, establish support 
services for victims and remove the defence of honour in regard to the 
assault or murder of a female family member.103
 
DEVAW clearly states in its article 4 that “States should condemn violence 
against women and should not invoke any custom, tradition or religious 
consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its elimination”. 
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102 E/CN.4/1995/42, 22 November 1994, pt. 73-78 
103 General Recommendation No. 19, pt.24 
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5 Shari‛a – the sources of 
divine law 
A basic understanding of Shari‛a and the religious structures of Islam is 
essential for the following discussion. In this chapter a brief history of the 
development of Islamic law will be given, and the most important issues in 
relation to this thesis will be explained. 
  
5.1 Sources and early development 
5.1.1 What is Shari‛a? 
To understand the meaning of Shari‛a, it is necessary to clarify a few things 
concerning Islam. The word Islam means “surrender” or “submission”, that 
is to say to the will of God. For a Muslim believer, the purpose of life is not 
simply to affirm but to actualize, not simply to profess belief in God but to 
realize God’s will. In comparison with Christianity you could say that 
emphasis within Christendom lie on orthodoxy, or correct doctrine or belief, 
while Islam’s emphasis lie on orthopraxy, or correct action. Of course 
without precluding the importance of faith.104  
 
The literal meaning of Shari‛a is “the road to the watering hole”, the clear, 
right, or straight path to be followed. In Islam it came to mean the divinely 
mandated path that Muslims were to follow.105 By the end of the eighth 
century an agreement between the different legal schools106 was reached 
that Shari‛a should consist of four sources, the Quran, the Sunna of the 
Prophet, consensus (ijma) of the community, and analogical reasoning or 
deduction (qiyas).107 Although these are the sources recognised by the 
majority of the Muslim community, a fifth source should also be mentioned 
since this is still in use in countries confessing to Shi‛i Islam.108
 
Purists of all eras, including many contemporary “fundamentalists”, have 
made a distinction between the divine Shari‛a, defined as God’s 
comprehensive and perfect design for His community, and a humanly 
produced Shari‛a, or, more precisely, the corpus of knowledge known as 
Fiqh, a necessarily flawed attempt to understand and implement that 
                                                 
104 Esposito, John L. Islam-The Straight Path, second edition, 1991, Oxford University 
Press,  p. 69f 
105 Ibid p79 
106 The legal schools of Sunni Islam. See XX 
107 Esposito, p78 
108 See 3.1.3 for an explanation of Shia Islam. 
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design.109 Thus, Shari‛a can be explained as the source, or the principles, 
from which Islamic law, Fiqh, is derived.110  
5.1.1.1 The Quran 
 
The Quran is the primary source of God’s revelation, principles and values, 
but it is not a law book. The meaning of the word Quran is recitation, and it 
is believed to have been revealed to the Prophet Muhammad under a period 
of 22 years. About five hundred of the 6666 verses in the Quran are 
concerned with law, many of them covering matters of prayers and ritual. 
Approximately eighty verses treat legal topics in the strict sense of the term: 
crime and punishment, contracts and family law.111  
 
Muslim jurists are faced with questions concerning the abrogation or repeal 
of the legal efficacy of certain verses of the Quran in favour of other 
verses.112 The content of some of the later verses appear contradictory to the 
earlier ones, and since the Quran is the primary source of Islamic law, the 
question of legal validity of every verse therein is crucial.113 (återkom till 
denna princip vid disk om polygami) 
 
5.1.1.2 The Sunna of the Prophet 
 
The belief that Muhammad was inspired by God to act wisely led to the 
acceptance of his example, or Sunna, as a supplement to the Quran, and 
thus, a material of the law. The Sunna includes what the Prophet said, what 
he did, and those actions that he permitted. The records of Prophetic deeds 
transmitted and preserved in tradition reports are called hadith.114  
 
Hadith literature is surrounded by controversies due to the question of their 
authenticity. The reason for this is that while State authorities collected the 
texts of the Quran soon after the death of the prophet, the Hadith were kept 
in a narrative tradition. It is also a historical fact that numerous of the 
Hadith were generated to reinforce societal norms and political 
expediency.115
 
Recently, Muslim feminists, recognizing the importance of Hadith to 
Islamic law and custom have suggested the use of feminist Hadith criticism 
since they view the scholars of the past as men locked in a patriarchal 
society. The Moroccan feminist Fatima Mernissi heads a project which aims 
among other things to collect and disseminate hadiths supporting women’s 
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rights. She has also used neo-traditional methods to undermine the authority 
of misogynist hadiths.116   
 
5.1.1.3 Ijma - Consensus  
 
After the death of Muhammad, consensus developed as a natural process for 
solving problems and making decisions – one followed the majority 
opinion. Despite attempts to define Ijma as this general consensus, classical 
Islamic jurisprudence defined this in a more restricted sense, namely that the 
religious authorities should act in behalf of and guide the entire Muslim 
community.117  
 
5.1.1.4 Qiyas - Analogical reasoning 
 
As a source of law, Qiyas comes into operation in matters, which have not 
been covered by a text of the Quran or Hadith, nor determined by the 
consensus of opinion.118 Throughout the development of Islamic law, reason 
has played an important role for interpreting law. When faced with new 
situations or problems, a similar situation can be sought in the Quran and 
the Sunna of the Prophet. The key is the discovery of the effective cause or 
reason behind a rule. If a similar reason can be identified in a new situation 
or case, then the Shari‛a judgement is extended to resolve that case as 
well.119
 
5.1.1.5 Ijtihad – Independent juristic reasoning  
 
In the literal sense, Ijtihad implies striving hard or strenuousness. 
Technically it means exercising independent juristic reasoning to provide 
answers, or to form an opinion on a rule of law when the Quran and Sunna 
are silent on a particular subject. This is done by applying Qiyas to the 
Quran and the Sunna. A person qualified to carry out Ijtihad is known as 
mujtahid. It is in Ijtihad that the Islamic legal doctrine was meant to find its 
evolutionary path.120
 
5.1.2 From dynamic to static law in 632-1300 
With the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, the Muslim Community 
was suddenly cut off both from further Quranic Revelations and from the 
Prophets own practice. That is, from further elaborations of the two sources 
mainly thought of as “secure knowledge”. Thereafter, the community 
                                                 
116 Ruth Roded, ”Women in Islam and the Middle East”, 1999, I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, p50 
117 Esposito p85 
118 Ali, p23 
119 Esposito, p83 
120 Ali, p23 and Hamdi, p.15 
 30
confronted the problems of developing a more detailed corpus of rules and 
procedures while continually adjusting to new social realities.121  
 
By the middle of the tenth century the schools of law had already developed 
their basic jurisprudential procedures and had elaborated a considerable 
body of legal materials.122 But henceforth and until the thirteenth centuries 
the standard of legal reasoning declined. Often, the dependence on analogy 
from individual cases drew attention from the more important principles of 
law, and was unable to provide a rigid cadre of rules for the regulation of 
social, familial, and commercial matters. The possibilities for individual 
interpretation and selection of numerous jurists combined with the 
discretion of judges in the application of the law gave Islamic law almost 
boundless flexibility in practice.123 By 1300 only the four major schools, the 
Hanafi, Shafi‛i, Maliki and Hanbali, had survived. The Hanafi, Maliki and 
Shafi‛i schools agreed that scholars of later generations were not free to give 
personal or independent interpretations of the law, and declared the “gate of 
Ijtihad” to be closed forever. The Hanbali school and a minority of Shafi‛i 
writers never accepted this124, and continued to uphold the authority of 
every legal scholar to use rational and independent judgement in legal 
questions.125
 
The body of principles collectively known as Shari‛a do not form a 
homogenous entity as these depend on interpretations of the sources, 
particularly the Quran and the Hadith, influenced by cultural and ethnic 
differences, historical contexts, colonial pasts, the sect or school of 
jurisprudence that a particular community subscribes to, as well as political 
and economic policy.126   
 
5.1.3 Different interpretations 
5.1.3.1 Sunni and Shia 
 
Islam has two major divisions: Sunni and Shi‘a. Sunni Muslims constitute 
85 percent of the world’s Muslims; Shi‘a about 15 percent. The name Sunni 
comes from their self-designation as ahl al-sunna wal jamaa, meaning 
“those who follow the Prophets example and thus belong to his 
community”.127 Sunni Muslims believe that Muhammad died without 
designating a successor, instead, he was succeeded by four caliphs, chosen 
by the elders, who all had been the Prophet’s companions earlier: Abu Bakr, 
Umar, Uthman and Ali. Their rule is especially significant for Sunni 
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Muslims since it, together with the period of Muhammad, is considered to 
be the normative period to which Muslims have looked back to for 
inspiration and guidance.128
 
The Shi‛a, or the party of Ali, is generally defined as those Muslims who 
believe that Ali, cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad was the Prophets 
chosen successor but was denied his proper place. The Shi‛a recognize a 
biological and spiritual line of leaders of the Muslim Community, called 
Imams, whom are believed to have descended from the Prophet through his 
daughter Fatima and Ali.129 The Imam is not considered to be a prophet, but 
is divinely inspired and sinless. He is both a political leader and a religious 
guide.130 Since the Shi‘a Muslims regard the Imam as the supreme legal 
interpreter, they reject Ijma and Qiyas as legal sources.131 According to 
most Shi‛is, the last imam went into occultation 874 and will reappear when 
God deems it appropriate.132 In the absence of the Imam, qualified religious 
scholars serve as his representatives. The Shi‘a have also elaborated their 
own hadith and law.133
 
In the past, tensions between Shi‛is and Sunnis ran high. In modern times, 
however, the call for the renewal of friendly relations between the two has 
grown and differences have been minimized. Nevertheless, certain practices 
unique to the Shi‛is are repugnant to Sunnis. The most outstanding is Shi‛i 
recognition of a form of contractual, temporary marriage in which the 
woman receives remuneration, a practice regarded illegal by the Sunnis. 
Shi‛ism has also been viewed as an oppositional, popular and more 
emotional strain of Islam as opposed to the legalist bent of Sunni 
scholars.134
 
5.1.3.2 Schools of law 
 
Shari‛a has its origin in the efforts of reform of existing legal standards in 
the seventh century. This task was not the work of a single group; it was 
carried out in many different regions, by men who in each place formed a 
school of law.135 The travels of scholars and students in search of hadith, 
and the appointment of provincial judges introduced the schools into new 
provinces.136 By the eleventh century, everyone was considered to be a 
member of one of the schools of law on the basis of birth, city or region.137
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The principal Sunni schools are the Hanafi, Shafi‘i, Maliki and Hanbali. 
Through the law schools, the scholars, commonly known as ulama, 
organized higher education and trained teachers and judicial 
administrators.138 The Hanafi and Hanbali schools were both Iraqi in origin, 
while Shafi‘i first developed in Egypt and the Maliki school in the 
Egypt/Northern African region.139
 
Shi‘a Islam has also generated its own schools, or sects; Jafari, Ismaili, 
Zaydi, Usuli, Akbari and others.140   
 
5.2 Shari‛a of today 
Notable about the Islamic world of today is the neo-Islamic movement or 
the Islamic revivalism, sometimes in the form of extremism. Well known 
movements are the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hizbullah, working 
towards a reimplementation of shari’a based laws.141 Islamic revivalism is 
reflected in an increased emphasis on religious observances, religious 
literature, television and radio programs and the growth of new Islamic 
associations.142 Islamic movements range from moderates who work within 
existing political systems to violent revolutionaries; from open membership 
to secret cells; and from democratic to totalitarian.143  
 
Although revivalists advocate for change through ijtihad, the majority of 
them tend to accept past practice and are only taking the initiative to change 
areas not already covered by Islamic law.144
 
In spite of the fact that neo-Islamic movements in the Arab world have 
received a great deal of scholarly attention in recent years, their ambiguous 
and changing positions on women’s roles in Islamic society has only begun 
to be studied.145  
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6 Three Country Examples 
6.1 Tunisia  
6.1.1 Historical background and political situation 
Tunisia achieved formal independence from France in 1956. The same year, 
Islamic courts, which used to preside over family law cases, were abolished. 
This was followed by the closure of the centre of Islamic learning, new 
liberal laws that granted women the right to marry without a guardian, 
equality between men and women with regard to divorce, and prohibition of 
polygamy and the wearing of the hijab. President Bourguiba’s religious 
reforms were so complete that social observers in the 1960’s questioned 
whether Tunisia might have entered a post-Islamic age.146   
 
Socialism was introduced by President Bourguiba in 1961, based on the 
claim that the Prophet’s companions were socialists even before the term 
was invented. Corruption and inefficiency soon led to public outcry, and the 
economic failures and extreme secularism opened the way for the Tunisian 
Islamic movement.147  
 
The battle between the authorities and the Islamists reached its peak in 1987 
when the entire state apparatus was mobilised against the Islamists, today 
known as Al-Nahda.148 Al-Nahda opposed the political and social grants to 
women in the Personal Status Code as being un-Islamic, but later changed 
to meaning that it was just part of a different school of law. That same year 
Bourguiba was overthrown by his own prime-minister Ben Ali, who 
adopted what looked like a more positive stand against Islam in general, but 
which eventually led to a total attack on Al-Nahda, forcing its leaders into 
exile.149
 
According to Human Rights Watch, government critics and human rights 
activists were arrested or harassed and hundreds of political prisoners 
confined under harsh conditions during 2002. Media allowed almost no 
criticism of the government, and opposition parties were either banned or 
actively impeded, the chief target for repression being the Islamist 
movement Al-Nahda.150  
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The wives of suspected Islamists were harassed by the Police, and the 
leading independent women’s rights group was occasionally prevented from 
convening public meetings. In spite of this, Tunisian women have since 
independence made considerable advances towards equality with men.151
 
6.1.1.1 Tunisian shari‘a in marriage and family relations 
 
Tunisias legal system of today is based upon a combination of French civil 
law and Shari‛a. The religious elite in Tunisia has historically belonged to 
the Hanafi school of law, although Malikis constitute the majority of the 
population.152
 
Although considered a very secular state, the Tunisian Constitution declares 
in its first article that Islam is state religion, and in article 38 that the 
religion of the president must be Islam. In order to comply with this, 
President Bourguiba tried to define a form of Islam that could be compatible 
with his liberal aims, which were to be achieved through ijtihad.153  
 
The Law of Personal Status was inspired by unofficial draft codes of Maliki 
and Hanafi family law and has been extended to apply not only to Muslims, 
but also to all Tunisian citizens. A notable feature of the Law of Personal 
Status is that it states different minimum ages for marriage, 20 for males and 
17 for females. During marriage are the spouses required to treat each other 
well and fulfil their marital duties “as required by custom and usage”.154
 
Under Tunisian law polygamy is forbidden, and constitutes a criminal 
offence, rendering a man who married before his previous marriage was 
dissolved liable to a penalty of one year’s imprisonment.155
 
6.1.2 Declarations and Reservations to CEDAW 
Tunisia ratified CEDAW in 1985 with reservations to articles 9, paragraph 
2; and 16, paragraph 1 (c), (d), (f), (g) (h), a declaration concerning article 
15, paragraph 4, and a general declaration. 
 
In its general declaration to CEDAW the Tunisian government declares that 
it will not take any decision to conform to CEDAW if such a decision would 
conflict with the provisions of chapter I of the Tunisian Constitution. The 
declaration to article 15, paragraph 4 is formulated in a similar way, stating 
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that the article must not be interpreted in a manner which conflicts with the 
provisions of chapters 23 and 61 of the Personal Status Code.156  
 
Reservations have been made, first, to the provisions in article 9, paragraph 
2 since it “must not conflict with the provisions of chapter VI of the 
Tunisian Nationality Code”. Secondly, Tunisia does not consider itself 
bound by article 16, paragraphs 1 (c), (d) and (f), and declares that 
paragraphs 1 (g) and (h) must not conflict with the provisions of the 
Personal Status Code concerning the granting of family names to children 
and the acquisition of property through inheritance. Last, Tunisia declares 
that it shall not be bound by article 29, paragraph 1, concerning the 
settlement of disputes between States Parties on the interpretation of the 
Convention, and goes on to consider that the disputes covered by article 29 
should only be submitted to the International Court of Justice with the 
consent of all parties to the dispute.157
 
6.1.3 The implementation of CEDAW Article 16 in 
Tunisia 
According to the CEDAW Committee, discriminatory provisions, especially 
in the nationality law and the Personal Status Code, continues to be a 
concern. Although the Constitution provides for the equality of all citizens 
and the 1997 amendment to the Constitution introduced the concept of non-
discrimination with regard to political parties, the Constitution does not 
contain a specific provision prohibiting discrimination against women and 
there is no definition of such discrimination in accordance with article 1 of 
the Convention, which prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination. The 
Committee is also concerned at the lack of legal remedies to ensure the 
Constitutional provision on equality is enforced or court decisions in which 
women have obtained redress for acts of discrimination.158
 
Another concern is that there is a lack of systematic data collection on 
violence against women, including domestic violence. No specific 
legislation has been enacted to combat domestic violence and sexual 
harassment. The Committee is concerned that article 218 of the Penal Code 
provides that the withdrawal of a case by a victim terminates any 
proceeding.159
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The CEDAW Committee urges Tunisia to withdraw its reservations, include 
a prohibition on discrimination against women in national law and to enact 
specific legislation on domestic violence.160
 
6.2 Egypt 
6.2.1 Historical background and political situation 
Due to Britain’s long-standing presence in Egypt, and the continued British 
political influence despite nominal independence in 1922, Egyptian politics 
were dominated by the demands for national independence up until 1956. 
During this period the Muslim Brotherhood played a crucial role in rallying 
its support for the cause of national liberation.161
 
Shari’a courts were integrated into the national court system in 1956, with 
separate judges for the legislation applicable to cases involving Copts and 
Muslims.162
 
During the Nasser regime between 1956 and 1970, members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood were persecuted. The Nasser regime’s policy of creating 
martyrs was a decisive factor for the future of Islamist thinking and 
practice.163
 
Nasser’s regime was followed by the nepotism of Sadat, focusing on ridding 
himself of the leftist wing. Sadat stopped the persecution of the 
Brotherhood, but also made a clear distinction between religion and politics. 
It was this distinction that eventually led to his assassination in 1981.164  
 
Sadat was succeeded by his Vice-president Hosni Mubarak, who has given 
Islamic movements far greater freedom in recent years, and the state seems 
to be willing to concede on certain issues in order to ease the pressure. 
Islamist sympathizers and especially members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
today work actively inside ministries, unions, syndicates and the media to 
get their message across.165
 
Feminist activity in Egypt had started in the late 1880’s – a time of great 
national turbulence as a result of British colonial domination. The first 
Egyptian Women’s Union was set up in 1923. Soon after, the differences in 
strategies and ways of thinking between members became apparent, and led 
to the establishment of other associations. Today there are various groups 
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formed around various issues. There are state-sponsored organizations, but 
those who are not find themselves hampered by laws that prohibit “any 
involvement in politics, or political activity”.166  
 
6.2.1.1 Egyptian Shari’a in Marriage and Family relations 
 
Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution provides that Shari‛a is “the principal 
source of legislation”, as amended on 22 May 1980, being a significant 
change from the Constitution of 1971, which had referred to Shari‛a as only 
“a principal source of legislation”.167
 
Even though most Egyptian laws are to a large extent inspired by European 
legal systems – the only law that is quite explicitly based on the Shari‛a is 
the Personal Status Law, which deals with marriage, divorce and custody of 
children. The Personal Status Law is a legal domain governed by the Shari‛a 
according to the Hanafite school, which is the predominant school of law in 
Egypt.168  
 
Article 11 of the Egyptian Constitution, which states that the State shall 
enable a woman to reconcile her duties towards her family with her work in 
society, appears to entrench the woman’s primary role as mother and 
homemaker, although the Egyptian Constitution guarantees equality of men 
and women.169
 
The Civil Code, article 280, states that recourse should be had to the most 
appropriate opinion from the Hanafi school in the absence of any textual 
provision in the legislation.170
 
The minimum marriage age is 18 for males and 16 for females. Polygamy is 
permissible as long as existing and intended wives are notified.171
 
A husband can exercise his right to divorce without having to declare any 
grounds for it. There are two forms of divorce: the irrevocable one and the 
revocable one. The former is effective on its occurrence while the revocable 
divorce is not effective until the lapse of three months. During this time the 
husband may reinstate his wife with or without her consent.172 The wife may 
obtain a revocable divorce on certain grounds, such as incurable defect of 
the husband, material or moral harm if the husband marries polygamously, 
non-payment of maintenance, or if the husband is imprisoned for more than 
three years.173 The Personal Status Law was amended in 2000, giving a 
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woman the right to irrevocable divorce if she forfeits all her financial claims 
and returns the dowry. This has to be preceded by an attempt to reconcile 
the spouses, carried out by two arbitrators within a period of three months. 
The requirement of an attempt at arbitration and reconciliation is based on 
the Shari‘a principles.174
 
In case of divorce, mothers have custody of boys until they reach the age of 
10, whilst girls remain in their mothers care until the age of 12. If the 
divorced mother remarries she loses custody of her children, who should 
then be placed in the custody of their maternal grandmother, or, if that is not 
feasible, their paternal grandmother, until they reach the age at which 
custody reverts to the father. The law seems to be implying that only women 
should look after young children.175
 
The distinction between rape and other forms of violence against women 
(e.g. domestic violence) has yet to be made clearly and explicitly. Until 
recently, “rape” and “violence against women” have been used 
interchangeably, since no other form of violence against women has been 
distinguished or at least elaborated politically. The debate on punishment 
for rape within marriage is alien to Egyptian legal and cultural 
formulations.176
 
Egyptian government encourages contraception, but when it comes to 
abortion Government policy is based on religious interpretations and 
pregnant women are only allowed a legal abortion if their health is 
threatened.177
 
In May 2001 the State Consultative Council of Egypt dismissed the recent 
parliamentary plea to amend the 1975 Nationality Law. Under this law an 
Egyptian man can transfer his nationality to his children while an Egyptian 
woman can do so only under limited circumstances.178
 
6.2.2 Reservations to CEDAW 
Egypt ratified CEDAW in 1981, with reservations to articles 2, 9, 16 and 29. 
 
To article 2, which require the States Parties to embody the principle of 
equality in national legislation and to establish legal protection of the rights 
of women, Egypt has put down a general reservation, stating its willingness 
to comply with it as long as it does not run counter to Shari‛a.179  
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The reservation to article 9 concerns the equal rights between men and 
women with respect to the nationality of their children. Egypt considers that 
the child’s acquisition of his father’s nationality is most suitable for the 
child, and that it is customary for a woman to agree, upon marrying an alien, 
that her children shall be of the father’s nationality.180
 
The reservation to article 16 is motivated with it being “out of respect for 
the sacrosanct nature of the firm religious beliefs that govern marital 
situations in Egypt and which may not be called in question”. Further, the 
government of Egypt states that there has to be an equivalence of rights and 
duties to guarantee true equality between the spouses, and that the wife’s 
rights to divorce is restricted due to the fact that the husband is obliged to 
maintain her while she retain full rights over her property.181
 
Finally, Egypt has made a reservation against article 29 concerning the 
submission to an arbitral body of any dispute that may arise between States 
concerning the interpretation of the Convention.182
 
6.2.3 The implementation of CEDAW Article 16 in 
Egypt 
Since the Egyptian ratification of CEDAW in 1981, Egypt has submitted 
three reports to the CEDAW Committee, the last one examined in 2001. 
 
In its Concluding Observation the Committee noted that the persistence of 
patriarchal attitudes with respect to the role of women and men in the family 
and in society limit the full implementation of CEDAW. A perception 
enhanced by the stereotypical portrayal of women in the media, which is 
likely to encourage discrimination and undermine any attempts at 
equality.183  
 
The Shari‛a based laws accounted for in section 6.2.1.1 should of course 
also be considered as examples of failures to implement CEDAW article 16.  
 
Apart from the legal examples above, the main concerns expressed by the 
CEDAW Committee are: The lack of a holistic approach to the prevention 
and elimination of violence against women, for example marital rape, 
violence against women in detention centres and crimes committed in the 
name of honour, the high number of early marriages of girls, and the 
continued legal authorization of polygamy.184
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The Government of Egypt is urged by the Committee to conduct a survey to 
determine the extent of violence against women, and to assess the impact of 
existing measures to address the various forms of violence.  
 
6.3 Yemen 
6.3.1 Historical background and political situation 
Yemen has, since ancient times, been a centre of an agricultural and state-
organised society, ruled by the Zaydi Dynasty from 893 to 1962.185 Yemen 
entered the colonial age in 1839, when Britain seized the port of Aden. The 
north was incorporated in the Ottoman Empire between 1872 and 1918, but 
the British control in the south would not be lifted until 1967.186  
 
A military coup in 1962 established the Yemen Arab Republic in the north, 
and the British withdrawal five years later led to the creation of the People’s 
Republic of South Yemen, later the People’s Democratic Republic of 
Yemen. Relations between the two Yemens were strained, but began to 
improve by the early 1980’s.187
 
In 1975 a commission of Shari‛a jurists was created to participate in the 
legislative restatement of Shari‛a materials in the Yemen Arab Republic. 
These legislative efforts were being initiated in a postcolonial era of 
questionings of Western values and reassertions of indigenous ones.188
 
After almost 20 years, the Yemen Arab Republic of the north and the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen succeeded in their unification 
attempts. A unity constitution was agreed upon in May 1990. It affirmed 
Yemen's commitment to free elections, a multiparty political system, the 
right to own private property, equality under the law, and respect of basic 
human rights.189
 
In spite of this, the human rights record of Yemen is very poor; the 
government has failed to implement basic human rights in most areas. 
Reports of kidnapping of foreign tourists and diplomats are numerous, as 
are assaults on freedom of expression. Several journalists have been 
questioned and detained by security forces without charge, and opposition 
or independent newspapers have been targets of defamation suits brought by 
the Ministry of Information. Internet access is only available through a 
government company, and websites containing political content are blocked. 
The government also seems reluctant to take legal measures against private 
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jails and prisons, mostly operated by prominent tribal and regional 
leaders.190   
 
6.3.1.1 Yemeni Shari’a in marriage and family relations 
 
Yemenis are divided into two principal Islamic religious groups: the Zaidi 
school which is part of the Shi‘a tradition, found in the north and northwest, 
and the Shafi‘i school of Sunni Muslims, found in the south and southeast. 
The Zaidi school is comparatively unknown, having flourished mainly in 
Yemen. The differences between these two schools are minor.191  
 
The Constitution of Yemen, adopted in 1991, declares in its first two articles 
Yemen an “Arabic Islamic State” and Islam as the official state religion. 
Article 3 states that “Islamic Shari‛a shall be the source of all legislation”. 
Article 31 states that women “have rights and duties, which are guaranteed 
and assigned by Shari‛a and stipulated by law”.192
 
The women of Yemen face institutionalised discrimination, especially in 
personal status and criminal law. Although women enjoy the same “general 
rights and obligations” as men under the constitution of Yemen, they face 
discrimination in national legislation. Under law 20/1992 on personal status, 
women are required to sue for divorce while men can divorce at will, and 
only a male guardian can contract marriage for women, who in turn have no 
way to give meaningful consent. Divorced mothers, unlike divorced fathers, 
loose custody of their children upon remarriage.193 The Personal Status Act 
goes on stating in its article 40 that the wife should obey the husband, that 
she must move in with him, permit him to have intercourse with her and not 
leave the home without his permission.194
 
In 1999, the rarely enforced minimum marriage age of fifteen for women 
was abolished, and instead the onset of puberty was set as a requirement for 
consummation of marriage, interpreted by conservatives as the age of 
nine.195 An amendment to the personal status law to introduce a minimum 
age – eighteen years – for marriage was introduced in 2001, but the proposal 
has not been passed by the parliament.196
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6.3.2 Reservations to CEDAW 
Yemen has declared that it does not consider itself bound by article 29, 
paragraph 1, relating to the settlement of disputes concerning the application 
or interpretation of the convention.197
 
6.3.3 The Implementation of CEDAW Article 16 in 
Yemen 
The former Democratic Yemen ratified CEDAW in 1984, and when South 
Yemen and Northern Yemen became one single state in 1990, it acceded to 
the Convention. The latest periodic report was submitted to the CEDAW 
Committee by Yemen in 2002. 
 
The Committee expressed its concern with the many discriminatory legal 
provisions, for example in the Penal Code, where a husband who kills his 
wife in relation to adultery is not charged with murder. The Committee is 
also concerned that the 1999 amendment to the Law of Personal Status has 
led to further discrimination against women in the family by denying 
women the right to equality in marriage and divorce.198  
 
Further, the Committee notes with concern the high rates of early marriages 
and high maternal mortality rates.199
 
The Committee urges the State party to review existing legislation and 
amend discriminatory provisions affecting women’s rights within the family 
in order to bring them into harmony with the Constitution and the 
Convention, to rise the minimum age of marriage for girls, and to develop 
health programmes to reduce maternal mortality.200
 
The Committee recommends that the State party conduct research into the 
extent of violence against women and girls and collect data on all forms of 
violence, including violence committed within the family. With regard to 
the practice of female genital mutilation, the Committee calls on the State 
party to enhance its activities to eradicate this harmful, traditional practice, 
especially through awareness-raising campaigns.201
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6.4 A Comment on the Three Country 
Examples 
With common denominators such as all having been parts of the Arab 
Empire and later dominated by the British and the French under the colonial 
era, these three countries, although all being referred to as “Arabic”, are not 
very much like the other. 
 
6.4.1  The reservations to CEDAW 
Article 28, paragraph 2, of CEDAW adopts the impermissibility principle 
contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This means that 
reservations to CEDAW are not permitted if they run counter to the object 
and purpose of the Convention. 
 
Article 2 and 16 are considered by the Committee to be core provisions of 
the Convention. Article 2 is viewed as central to the object and purpose of 
CEDAW, and that States parties which ratify it do so because they believe 
that discrimination against women in all its forms should be eliminated, and 
that the strategies set out in article 2 should be implemented. The CEDAW 
Committee also remains convinced that reservations to article 16, whether 
lodged for national, traditional, religious or cultural reasons, are 
incompatible with the Convention and should be reviewed and modified or 
withdrawn.202 This view is also held by several states parties to the 
Convention who have objected to these reservations. 
 
6.4.1.1 Remarks regarding Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen in this 
context 
 
Egypt has entered a general reservation to article 2 of CEDAW, although 
the Egyptian constitution prohibits discrimination. The constitution does, on 
the other hand, also promote the principles of Shari‛a as the basis for all 
laws. 
 
The reservations of Tunisia are the most encompassing when compared to 
Egypt and Yemen, but are not explicitly based on Shari‘a. The reservation 
refers however to chapter 1 of the Tunisian constitution, which states that 
Islam is state religion. 
  
Yemen has posed no reservations to the core provisions of CEDAW, but 
does on the other hand show great failure in its implementation of it, much 
due to the conservative laws based on Shari‘a. The government of Yemen 
seems to make the suggestion that the divine nature of its constitution and 
other laws grants them the right to ignore human-made laws such as 
CEDAW. 
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6.4.2 Remarks on some of the Cultural practices in the 
family that violate women’s rights 
FGM is believed to have started in Egypt some 2,000 years ago, and is still 
practiced there and in Yemen. Even though FGM predates Islam, religious 
reasons are sometimes given for its continuation.203  
 
Women are often seen to embody the honour of the men to whom they 
“belong”, and as such their virginity and chastity must be guarded. Honour 
killings are reportedly taking place in both Egypt and Yemen. Both 
countries Penal Codes allow for a defence to be based on honour. Honour 
crimes are not confined to Muslim communities only, and cannot be 
considered to be of Islamic origin. Alarmingly, the number of honour 
killings is on the rise as the perception of what constitutes honour and what 
damages it widens.204
 
From a CEDAW point of view, I find it interesting that none of these 
countries have made any reservation against article 5 of the Convention. 
Article 5 states that all States Parties shall take measures to modify social 
and cultural patterns, and work towards an elimination of prejudices and 
customary practices based on the idea of inferiority or superiority of either 
of the sexes. 
 
The gist of this is that since these practices are not necessarily assignable to 
Islam, there is no reason for them to be safeguarded by it either. 
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7 CEDAW and Shari‛a – a 
realistic match? 
The previous chapters have provided a background to Islamic law and 
Women’s rights. We have also taken a closer look at the implementation of 
CEDAW article 16 in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen. With this in mind, we will 
now go on to discussing how, and if, CEDAW and Shar‛ia can coexist. 
 
7.1 The Human Rights tradition within Islam 
The individualism characteristic of Western civilization was a fundamental 
ingredient in the development of human rights concepts. Individualism, 
however, is not a characteristic feature of Muslim societies or Islamic 
culture. At the rise of Islam, the mainstream Islamic thought tended to stress 
not the rights of human beings, but rather their duties to obey God’s perfect 
law, through which justice would be achieved. Still today one finds this 
emphasis on duties.205
 
In writings on the relationship Islamic-International law, many Muslims 
have espoused a wide range of opinions on rights – from the assertion that 
international human rights are fully compatible with Islam, to the claim that 
international human rights are products of alien western culture, 
representing values repugnant to Islam.206
 
Although Islamic countries as member States to the U.N. has ratified many 
of its conventions and undertaken binding legal obligations, their 
dissatisfaction at what they perceive as a secularisation or westernisation of 
international human rights instruments is evident. CEDAW has evoked 
particularly strong objections from many Islamic countries on the basis that 
some of its provisions contain values and pronouncements that are contrary 
to the Shari‛a. A clear manifestation of this objection is the amount of 
reservations made to CEDAW in the name of Shari‛a.207
 
 
Muslims in the 1980’s produced a large literature trying to define were 
Islam stands on human rights and comparing Islam and international human 
rights. The very existence of this literature, and the frequent reference to 
international human rights even by Muslims who quarrel with these show 
that international human rights concepts exists not only outside Islamic 
culture.208
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It is difficult to maintain that Muslim countries are outsiders to the present 
system of international law. Muslim countries have, without exception, 
joined the international community under United Nations auspices; they 
have agreed to be bound by international law. Muslim nations, like other 
nations, contribute to the formulation of international law in working with 
other countries in the UN, and in drawing up and ratifying treaties and 
conventions.209
 
Except when it comes to CEDAW, there has been little to distinguish the 
responses of the governments of Muslim countries to international human 
right’s principles from those of non-Muslim nations. Muslim countries have 
uneven records of ratifying the major HR conventions, and the 
dissimilarities in the patterns of ratification and non-ratification indicate 
that, from the governmental perspective, there is no single, definitive 
interpretation of Islamic rights principles standing in the way of accepting 
international human rights.210
 
7.2 The Right to Religion and Culture 
Despite all international norms and standards, the tension between universal 
human rights and culture is a part of the everyday life of millions of people. 
Cultural markers and cultural identity that allow a group to stand united 
against a more powerful majority often entail restrictions on the rights of 
women.211
 
UDHR article 18 states that everyone has the right to freedom of religion, 
and that this right includes the freedom to manifest that religion in 
“teaching, practice, worship and observance”. This right is to be exercised 
by individuals, not by governments over its subjects. International law does 
not accept that fundamental human rights may be restricted or permanently 
curtailed by reference to the requirements of any particular religion.212
 
The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief states that discrimination on the 
grounds of religion shall be condemned as a violation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.213
 
7.2.1 State Responsibility 
States are responsible for bringing their domestic law and practice into 
conformity with their obligations under international law to protect and 
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promote human rights. This responsibility does not only apply to laws 
enacted by state organs, but also to those of religious or customary sources. 
This means that all inconsistencies between international human rights law 
and national religious and customary laws have to be removed.214
 
Article 4 of the DEVAW states that “States should condemn violence 
against women and should not invoke any custom, tradition or religious 
consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its elimination”.215
 
7.3 Are the Rights in CEDAW article 16 
Customary International Law? 
7.3.1 Character of Customary International Law 
The fundamental significance of a norm’s customary character is that the 
norm binds states that are not parties to that particular instrument.216
 
According to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Court shall 
apply international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law, when settling disputes submitted to it.217
 
For the establishment of a customary rule, several requisites have to be 
fulfilled. First, there has to be a sufficient degree of state practice by a 
number of states concerning a situation falling within the domain of 
international relations. Secondly, there has to be a repetition of that practice 
over a considerable period of time. Thirdly, the practice has to be consistent 
with prevailing international law, and finally, there has to be general 
consent in the practice by other states.218
 
A customary rule does not arise and exist once and for all. It has to be 
confirmed repeatedly by State practice and accompanied by opinio juris. If 
the substance of State practice change, so will the content of the customary 
rule.219
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7.3.2 Applied to CEDAW article 16 
Customary international law is in general quite difficult to prove, and to 
establish a principle in customary international law that prohibits all kinds 
of discrimination on grounds of gender would be very difficult. There is 
however a few authors that support the existence of such a principle, but its 
scope would be problematic and controversial.220  
 
The determination of whether CEDAW article 16 is a part of customary 
international law depend on several factors, such as the degree of unanimity 
of its adoption, the intention of the supporting governments, and the 
existence of contrary state practice.221 Although a great number of states 
have ratified CEDAW, the amount of reservations to it, and to article 16 in 
particular, makes it difficult to argue that CEDAW has become such a 
norm.222   
 
On the other hand there are suggestions that the UDHR has entered the 
status of customary international law, which would include the right to 
equality, the right to marry and the right to equal rights in marriage and 
divorce.223  
 
CEDAW article 16.2 concerning child marriage might constitute an 
exception since the Convention on the Rights of the Child is the most 
widely ratified Convention in the world, indicating international consensus 
on the norms contained in its provisions.224  
 
7.3.2.1 Domestic Violence 
 
Many cultural practices in the family involve “severe pain and suffering” 
and may be considered “torture like” in their manifestation. The right to be 
free from torture is considered by many scholars to be jus cogens, meaning 
that it is a basic principle of international law which states are not allowed 
to contract out of.225
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 7.4 The work of the CEDAW Committee – 
consistency and efficiency 
In my opinion, being the monitoring body of CEDAW, the CEDAW 
Committee faces a great challenge, and great responsibility as the main 
instrument with which to support and pressure States parties to the 
Convention in their implementation efforts. In order to do this efficiently, it 
is important that the work of the CEDAW Committee is consistent. 
 
In the cases of Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, the Committee address the 
problems of discriminatory provisions in the national law of each country 
and also give examples of such provisions. This seems to be done without 
regard to the reservations made by Tunisia and Egypt, since the non-
compliance with these articles is commented upon anyway.  
 
The length of the Concluding Comments are approximately the same, and 
there are both pro’s and con’s with regard to that. A longer comment would 
be able to address the various issues in detail and with more depth. Today, 
the issues at concern are merely being introduced and then urged to be acted 
upon. I believe that the few pinpointed law provisions serve as good 
examples but do not reflect the scope of discriminatory laws in that 
particular country. On the other hand it is not the Committee’s job to rewrite 
the laws of these countries.  
 
There seems to be a general consensus that the advancement of women will 
only bring good to the world. In spite of this, there is a reluctance to support 
this struggle fully, even within the U.N. According to CEDAW article 20, 
shall the Committee meet for a period of “not more than two weeks 
annually”, while the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the Committee against 
Torture has no such time limit. This lack of resources is a factor that indeed 
should limit the efficiency and affect the monitoring ability of the 
Committee in a negative way.226
 
Even though no sanctions exist to control the implementation of CEDAW, it 
is clear that the Convention and its Committee has an important role to play 
in the process of achieving equality. Most states have established Women’s 
Commissions with the, at least official, goal to implement CEDAW in 
respective country, and these commissions will hopefully lead the way 
towards change. Four years might seem as a long time in between meetings 
with these countries, and the members of the Committee changes. But the 
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establishment of a good contact, and the encouragement from the 
Committee will, is my belief, in time achieve goals set. 
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8 Conclusion 
In this thesis I have tried to look at family relations, marriage in particular, 
and the consequences they might bear with them for women when different 
interpretations of Shari‘a is applied.  
 
I think it is important to bear in mind that all these problems should be seen 
as interrelated. Discrimination and violence within the family prevents 
women from participating fully in society, which in turn leads to economic 
dependence, forcing many women to stay in a destructive relationship since 
there are no other options. Different factors, such as education, the role of 
today’s advanced technology and health aspects continue to affect women’s 
lives everywhere. 
 
8.1 CEDAW and Shari‘a – in the hands of the 
interpreter 
No state is free to violate the universal human rights of its subjects on the 
grounds of national sovereignty, although nations’ sovereignty of course 
must be respected. Saying that Shari‘a is incompatible with Women’s rights 
is a far too easy way to answer the complicated question of how, and if, 
Shari‘a can be fitted into a human rights realm.  
 
Attempts by governments to justify their rejection of international human 
rights on the basis that they clash with Shari‘a principles, and can therefore 
not be implemented, are weak. These governments have long ago given up 
their right to continue a discussion of this kind since they already have 
shown their acceptance of human rights law in various ways. For example 
by having joined and worked in the U.N. and by ratifying conventions and 
declarations, among them the international bill of rights. International 
human rights law would become quite undermined if a leader of a state 
suddenly could proclaim that the state no longer is to be bound by the 
conventions it has signed.  
 
It is clear that the laws and practices criticized by the CEDAW Committee 
and accounted for in previous chapters, are violations of international 
human rights law. That these laws and practices should be changed in order 
to comply with CEDAW and other human rights instruments ratified by 
them are self-evident. Claims that human rights are a western concept, 
applicable to westerners only, and similar suggestions are preposterous – no 
one has forced neither Tunisia, Egypt nor Yemen to sign CEDAW. 
 
In entering Shari‘a based reservations, many Muslim states treat Islamic law 
as if it were a supernatural religious law that binds them, whereas in reality, 
the Shari‘a laws on the national level does not necessarily have any 
resemblance with those of other states, as the cases of Yemen, Egypt and 
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Tunisia well have shown. Moreover, these three countries do not make 
reservations to the same provisions of CEDAW, again indicating that they 
have dissimilar opinions regarding which articles of CEDAW that conflict 
with Islamic law. 
 
Even though the reservations of Egypt and Tunisia should be considered 
incompatible with CEDAW, they can also be seen as a statement, where the 
actual ratification of CEDAW clarifies that the aim and will of the State 
Party is to implement it, but also shows awareness with its failure and 
difficulties in achieving that aim immediately. The case of Yemen is 
however, in my opinion, an insult to CEDAW, women and human rights in 
general. 
 
It is true that there is no constituency to be found in the reservations against 
CEDAW, but it is evident however that there is a reaction to the issue of 
women’s emancipation throughout the Arabic world of today. This reaction 
has its roots in a historical, male need to control his family, and in particular 
the sexuality of the women close to him, but isn’t necessarily Islamic. The 
destruction of this view is one of the most vital aims of the human rights 
movement of today. 
 
When the Shari‘a based laws of for example Yemen constitutes a breach of 
human rights, we allow an entire religion to take the punishment for this. 
According to several Muslim scholars and human rights activists, Islam is a 
religion that confirms the international human rights laws. It is the 
individual states that should be criticized for their application of the Shari‘a, 
not the Muslim community. 
 
As for the so favoured image of Arabic societies as a religious entity, I 
believe that I have shown the opposite. It is my opinion that any human 
rights violation in these countries is blamed upon Islam, and that such 
accusations are false. Of course it is all a matter of interpreting Shari‘a 
sources, and here we have some good examples: the Tunisian government 
claims to be secular, but still uses their interpretations of Shari‘a to justify 
their law making; for example the ridding of the hijab and prohibition of 
polygamy. In the case of Yemen, the constitution is based upon Shari‘a, and 
personal status and penal code claims religious sources. In both Egypt and 
Yemen, the provisions restricting women from equal rights within the 
family and in marriage are products of the interpretations of Shari‘a.  
 
Many practices that are discriminatory to women do not have an Islamic 
origin, but are being treated and promoted as if they did. Therefore, they 
should be separated from Islam and even condemned as opposing it. It is 
clear that it is the interpreters and/or the political leaders who are 
responsible for the inequalities based on Shari‘a that constitutes everyday 
life for millions of women. If promoted, or even sanctioned, by respective 
governments, the rights in CEDAW article 16 could provide an excuse for 
both men and women for not following the discriminatory customs and 
traditions their society lives by.  
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The conservative elite of countries such as Yemen and Egypt, hide behind a 
fictive shield of Islam, claiming a divine equality, while in reality the 
victims of these violations against international human rights law has no 
shields to protect them from their own governments, husbands and fathers. 
 
The question of how to effect changes in practice are however not one of the 
objectives of this thesis, but the use of itjtihad should be able to bring 
discriminatory Shari‛a laws into compliance with the rights under CEDAW 
article 16.  
 
Interpretations of Shari‘a are many, and new, female interpreters are starting 
to make their voices heard, questioning the older interpretations. Hopefully, 
in the not so distant future, the respect for women and their human rights 
will be shown not only in the words of God, but also by the men in power to 
change existing laws.  
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